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1 
The Digital Party as a Vehicle for Transformational  
Political Change in Arab Spring Countries: 




The Ba'ath Party has dominated the political sphere in Syria since 
the rule of Hafiz Al-Assad. It prevented any kind of social or 
political practices or organizational experiences at any level, 
except under the approval and full scrutiny of the regime. This 
kind of oppression continued after Bashar Al-Assad took over the 
presidency in 2000, which in turn played a crucial role in the 
opposition’s evident inexperience after the 2011 Uprising. 
Supporters of the Uprising were looking for structured, organized 
leadership to represent and develop their movement, but the 
opposition formations, official and nonofficial, proved incapable 
of fulfilling that role.        
Opposition political parties, whether longstanding or nascent, 
Islamist or secularist, have deep organizational problems. None 
has presented a clear vision, strategy, or project to help the people 
achieve their demands. In general, parties have been beset by poor 
institutionalization, with a lack of clear organizational structure, 
and an absence of lucid decision-making processes. While parties 
are supposed to be spaces for plural thinking and acting, 
individualism prevailed, with incoherence and inconsistency 
existing between parties’ ideologies and their members’ 
practices, and between members themselves, exacerbating the 
tribal and confessional loyalties and tendencies that served to 
undermine collective national identity. Therefore, instead of 
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taking their role in modernizing Syrian society, raising 
awareness, educating citizens, and building a common national 
identity, parties conceded those roles to follow narrow ethnic or 
ideological interests, and sometimes foreign agendas. As a result, 
they have been incapable of attracting and mobilizing grassroots, 
especially the young.  
While those shortcomings differed in degree from one party to 
the other, all of them shared the factor of excluding grassroots 
whilst taking “cadre-party” form. In doing so, political parties 
have squandered the momentum of the Uprising and the vital 
power of organized masses. Not only that, but it also shattered the 
potential competencies of activists and participants, turning their 
zeal into total apathy. On the other hand, the mobilizational 
incapability of those parties was one of the reasons, along with 
the regime’s brutal repression, that led to the Movement’s 
militarization, followed by its radicalization at a later stage. 
Subsequently, parties lost the trust of the people and thus their 
legitimacy and representational capacity, which they replaced by 
seeking legitimacy from regional and international powers. 
Syrian opposition parties, who appeared to be preoccupied 
with their intra- and inter-party struggles, should look for new 
resources and practices to re-legitimize their role. They need to 
grow into major players through grassroots engagement, rather 
than through foreign power endorsements. It is necessary for the 
Syrian people demanding democratic transition to be part of the 
discourse about key issues of their political future.  
This paper advocates that using internet technologies towards 
adopting the digital party model might represent the solution to 
re-engage the masses in the political process, allowing for public 
participation and inclusiveness in the decision-making process. 
The format of the digital party could well precisely represent the 
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inclusive tool and innovative solution that is needed with its open, 
easy membership, participatory platform, allowing for 
transparent bottom-up policies and decision-making processes. 
Although using the digital party model will not instantaneously 
solve all the mounting problems of apathy and distrust, it might 
yet provide the type of organizational change that will help 
narrow the gap between the elites and grassroots and affect 
positively parties' roles and performance.  
 
 
1. Background: Political Context before 2011 Uprising  
1.1.  Hafiz al-Assad (1970-2000) 
Hafiz al-Assad took power in Syria in 1970 by a military coup. 
He ruled Syria with an iron fist, prohibiting public freedoms and 
political activities. The ruling party was the Arab Socialist Ba'ath 
Party. Political regulations were monocratic, restricting all 
opposition parties and dissident movements, but tolerating the 
existence of mock parties under a “progressive national front.”1 
These rules restricted opposition activities and prevented the 
establishment of opposition parties, which resulted in Ba'athists 
dominating the political sphere.  
Ba'ath Party apparatus was one of the key instruments – in 
addition to the army, security services, and state bureaucracy – 
through which the regime controlled the country. Party members 
had priority over any other candidates in obtaining jobs or state-
related positions. This allowed the party apparatus to take control 
of all key strategic functions within the state.2 With more than 2 
million members in 2000, and 2.8 million members in 2012, who 
were organized in a hierarchical structure, and spread all over the 
country, and nearly all the state institutions, the party controlled 
all state critical and non-critical occupations.3 In addition to the 
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hierarchical arrangement of Ba'ath Party members, other citizens 
were also organized in syndicates, federations, unions and other 
associations, according to their profession or background. This 
system of organization operated regardless of whether citizens 
were members of the Ba'ath Party or not, though with a semi-
mandatory condition that Ba'athists presided over those 
syndicates. The goal was to keep the masses under the full 
surveillance and dominance of the state and to extend the scope 
of the Ba'ath party’s base.4  
Indeed, the possibility of forming an institutionalized network 
independent from the state’s control was slim to none. Efforts to 
create an active civil society, especially an organized one, were 
halted. Even syndicates, which were supposed to be potential 
focal points for organizing grassroots initiatives after the 
revolution, were rendered ineffective. While they were ostensibly 
created for people to network, organize their endeavours, and 
represent their interests, the purpose became subverted towards a 
means for the state to assert hegemony over the society, divide it, 
and prevent any vital movements or activities.5  
As for the political opposition, like the conditions of 
oppositions under repressive regimes, the situation was ominous. 
Anyone engaged in any action associated with political 
opposition, or even suspected of being involved in such conduct, 
was incarcerated, tortured, or expatriated.6 Hence, the opposition 
was completely deprived of practicing politics before the 
Revolution, except for some exiled individuals. This, to some 
extent, explains the debilitated performance of the opposition 
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1.2. Bashar al-Assad (2000 until the 2011 Uprising)  
Bashar al-Assad's succession to the presidency in 2000, with his 
promises of reforms in his inaugural speech, generated optimism 
that the young president might represent a new era of political and 
economic improvements. Intellectuals and political activists 
started establishing political forums as free spaces for raising 
awareness, holding open discussions, and formulating civil and 
political demands. The objectives revolved around political 
freedom, including lifting the 1963 state of emergency, releasing 
political detainees, instituting regulations for establishing parties 
and a plural party system amongst others. However, this period, 
the so-called “Damascus Spring”, did not last long; from July 
2000 to February 2001 in fact, after which the regime cracked 
down on these forums and imprisoned participants.8  
Another important vigorous surge of the opposition occurred 
during the years 2005-2006, with the announcement of the 
“Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change”, signed by 
several opposition figures and formations. This was an attempt to 
unite the opposition and, inter alia, recommence the demands of 
the “Damascus Spring”. The regime ignored the opposition 
demands of reform, arresting several leaders and members of the 
coalition, under the allegation that the opposition and its demands 
were a Western conspiracy aimed at weakening the Syrian state.9  
The oppression of the opposition continued without any 
indication of imminent positive changes until the eruption of the 
2011 Uprising, after which the regime initiated superficial 
reforms to quell popular demands.10 Reforms involved lifting the 
emergency state and introducing some constitutional reforms, 
including the re-writing parts of the constitution. Most notably 
this involved the removal of Article 8 of the former 1973 
constitution, which stated that the Ba'ath Party was the leading 
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party of the society and the state, replacing it with an inclusive 
article which granted political pluralism while discarding Ba'ath 
Party exclusivity to leadership of the state. Furthermore, it 
explicitly allowed the establishment of new parties under specific 
conditions.11  
 
1.3. The Syrian Uprising of 2011 
At the beginning of 2011, anti-government uprisings erupted in 
Syria after the Arab Spring swept through several Arab countries 
including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. People took to the 
streets in peaceful demonstrations but were confronted by brutal 
armed forces of the Syrian regime, resulting in hundreds of 
killings and arrests.12  
In late 2011, the peaceful protesting developed into armed 
conflict as the spiral of the Syrian regime's violence continued 
unabated. The regime’s viciousness triggered the masses to step-
up their demands from general political and legal reforms into 
regime change.13 The conflict worsened in the following years 
and developed into a mixture of civil and proxy wars involving 
regional and international powers.14  
The brutality of Assad’s regime forced a substantial part of the 
opposition, as well as civilians, to leave the country owing to the 
threat of arbitrary detention, execution, and enforced 
disappearance. According to the United Nations, there are over 
five million registered Syrian refugees in the year 2020.15 While 
a significant number of those refugees, expatriates and displaced 
people could be opponents of the current Syrian regime, no 
official statistics exist on the political preferences of those 
refugees, despite it being worthy of study, bearing in mind 
refugees’ relevant security concerns, especially when located in 
countries with positive bilateral relations with the Syrian regime. 
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Displaced opposition activists found themselves scattered in 
different countries, without being able to participate effectively in 
the political discourse anymore, rendering different social media 
platforms the only channels for participation. Meanwhile, the 
political scene had been seized by a few officially nominated 
opposition coalitions, starting with Syrian National Council 
(2011),16 then National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (2012),17 and more recently the High 
Negotiations Committee (2016).18  
Various non-official political opposition formations have been 
established since the onset of the Uprising, but almost none can 
be described as “grassroots” organizations, in the sense of taking 
on the role of organizing the masses, mobilizing them, linking 
leaders and activists, and benefiting from the potential of 
opposition activists. Moreover, the opposition – official and non-
official – failed to represent grassroots demands and were unable 
to achieve a framework of cooperation for advancing objectives 
during critical stages of the Uprising.19 One could argue that an 
integrational outline for the opposition with a national agenda 
would have prevented any struggle over the question of grassroots 
representation, which many political opposition formations 
claimed without any established lines. Such an outline could have 
also reassured the international community, which was wary 
about the lack of a proper replacement for the current regime, a 
credible alternative that might have led the country during a 
critical transitional period.20  
 
2. Types of Political Parties after 2011 Uprising  
At the onset of the Syrian Revolution of 2011, activists started to 
organize the popular movement through small coordination 
bodies (Tansiqiat), which acted as secret cells to cope with the 
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organizational needs of the popular movement, especially given 
the geographical and demographical breadth of the 
demonstrations. Tansiqiat used social media platforms to 
organize and spread information about gatherings and protesting 
points, among other activities. These activists, who articulated the 
demands of the Uprising, emanated from the middle-classes, from 
diverse professional backgrounds and ethnicities. 
Demographically, they were spread all over Syria and, in the case 
of dissident expatriates, also abroad.21  
However, new sophisticated political configurations replaced 
these revolutionary-type civil networks and pre-political 
organizations. This replacement is ascribed to two fundamental 
reasons. First, the popular movement’s demands for an organized 
political representation and leadership.22 Second, the 
international community’s pressure for organized and unified 
opposition. The transformation from grassroots-resistance style 
groupings into organized political-elite style configurations gave 
birth to what became termed “opposition”. The replacement of a 
civil-revolutionary act with the organized-political act had the 
consequence of converting the conflict to revolve around a new 
power binary of “regime-opposition” instead of the binary 
“regime-people” as before.23  
Away from the formal coalitions, unofficial formations were 
initiated under different designations – party, movement, current 
– without any clear basis for distinction.24 In doing so, some of 
them simply tried to avoid the description “party” as it had 
negative connotations from the past, while others tried to avoid 
the entailed accountability.25  
A party can be defined in numerous ways. According to 
Sartori, “In general, parties are defined in terms of (i) actors, (ii) 
actions (activities), (iii) consequences (purposes), and (iv) 
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domain. But parties can also be defined with exclusive respect to 
their function, to their structure, or to both; or in the light of the 
input-output scheme; and in still other ways.”26 For the purpose 
of this study, parties will include all these formations, except for 
self-declared civil society or non-political organizations. 
Various parties have been founded based on ethnic, national, 
and religious identities, amongst others. For example, the 
Kurdish-nationalist formations – formal and informal – have 
manifested themselves noticeably on the political scene.27 For the 
purpose of this paper, parties after the 2011 Uprising will be 
categorized in two ways. Firstly, chronologically, considering the 
Uprising as the focal event. Secondly, by the ideologies those 
parties embraced. 
 
2.1. Parties’ Classification on a Chronological Basis  
2.1.1.  Longstanding Parties (Initiated before the 2011 
Uprising) 
Longstanding opposition formations dominated the political 
sphere after the Uprising. They were comprised of old parties and 
political figures who were working covertly before the Uprising. 
Some of those longstanding parties kept their original formation, 
with some changing their names while keeping the same former 
structure and practices, while others entered new alliances and 
coalitions forming new bodies.28  
However, those parties that retained their pre-Uprising 
structure found they were unable to interact with the grassroots or 
to guide them because of their old-fashioned practices and 
ideologically controlled attitudes towards key national issues. In 
addition, a legacy of leader-dominated parties frustrated the 
opportunity to build consensus across parties and political groups, 
which resulted in polarization among the opposition. 
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Nevertheless, there was the opportunity that those parties and 
figures could have served as the starting point for an 
institutionalized leadership of the masses if they had acted in an 
inclusive non-partisan manner. They had the basic requirements, 
such as political experience, rudimentary organizational 
structure, and wide networks inside and outside Syria however, 
they failed to act in a non-partisan manner.29  
 
2.1.2. Nascent Parties (Initiated after the 2011 Uprising)  
A growing number of nascent parties were initiated after the 
Uprising. Most of these newly established parties imitated older 
remaining parties with no modernization at any level. The old 
structures of leadership within the opposition parties had a 
palpable effect on those parties, to the extent of carrying on the 
legacy of enmities towards each other, viewing the “other” as a 
political enemy rather than political opponent. This caused deep 
polarization and fragmentation within the overall political 
opposition scene.30  
Some of these organizations can be termed “couch parties”, in 
that their membership was so small as to be able to fill only a 
single couch.31 Such parties tended to be short-sighted, fragile, 
with short life spans, and prone to splintering. Notable 
characteristics included no political experience, vision or plan 
along with overlapping or similar announcements, initial 
declarations, objectives and policies.32  
Not only were these parties characterized by such 
shortcomings, but many were also established with the support 
and financing of different regional and other international 
countries, rendering them mere branches or representatives of 
those powers and their agendas, rather than the interests of the 
Syrian people.33 Consequently, any deficiency in the financial 
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resources of those parties’ patrons often led to these parties’ 
transformation or merging into other formations, or even 
vanishing.34  
In general, both long-standing and nascent parties were beset 
by poor institutionalization, with no founding constitution nor 
bylaw or clear organizational structure, and with no binding 
statement of party principles or clear decision-making processes. 
Nevertheless, even when the principles of the founding 
statements and procedures of some parties were clear, the plans 
for delivery were absent. While parties are supposed to be spaces 
for plural thinking and acting, individualism prevailed with 
incoherence and inconsistency existing between parties’ 
ideologies and their members’ practices, and between members 
themselves. Both types were incapable of attracting and 
mobilizing the grassroots, especially the young, because of the 
tribal and confessional loyalties that served to undermine 
collective national identity. Yet, this did not prevent many of 
those parties from claiming a representational role without any 
clear basis.35  
 
2.1.3.  Parties’ Classification on Ideological Bases (Islamist – 
Secularist)  
2.1.3.1. Islamist Parties 
The discourse about organized political Islamist formulation can 
be analysed through the prism of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 
a prevailing, global and long-established movement. Although 
many other Islamist formulations had emerged after the Uprising, 
the most organized and politically influential one was the MB, 
which remains one of the most prominent Islamist movements in 
Syria and most of the Middle East region.36  
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After the crackdown on the MB following the Hama massacre 
in 1982, most of the movement’s members left Syria.37 However, 
the movement continued its activities abroad, thereby retaining 
organizational abilities and gaining experience, which ensured 
the MB was in primary position vis-à-vis other Islamist 
formations to return to the Syrian political scene with the onset of 
the Uprising. Different elements accorded the MB a privileged 
status in the Syrian context. Amongst others, the MB maintained 
the discourse of grievances and injustices inflicted on the 
movement by Hafiz al-Assad’s regime, and its concurrent history 
of struggle to appeal to the public. It also manifested its strategy 
of being part of the local society through its various not-for-profit 
organizations, which gave the movement an embedded presence 
in Syrian society. Indeed, such a code of conduct proved essential 
to gaining credibility and legitimacy within local communities. 
Finally, the stable financing of the movement has had a crucial 
impact on its ability to organize activities.38  
The MB had the potential to lead the popular movement, but 
they failed drastically for a number of reasons, notably, 
prioritizing the regional project of the movement over the Syrian 
national agenda, and their attempt to enforce that project by 
manipulating the prevailing chaotic circumstances. The 
movement’s partisan attitude towards other Syrian political 
components included consistent attempts to have the upper hand 
on every official opposition coalition by forming the majority 
using different methods, such as creating more than one formation 
under different names but with affiliation to the MB.39  
 
2.1.3.2. Secularists Parties 
On the other side of the ideological spectrum lie secular parties, 
who differentiated themselves by, theoretically, upholding the 
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Syrian national agenda, and declaring their sets of values mainly 
by excluding any religious ideologies – namely Islamic – from 
influencing the political future of Syria. However, these secular 
parties were the least capable of leading the popular movement, 
no matter which label assigned themselves, be it Intellectual 
Elites, Liberals, Leftists, and Nationalists. They were incapable 
of gaining people’s trust for different reasons. These included 
leaning towards ideological advocacy instead of practicing 
politics; and trying to spread their ideologies and terminologies 
that were, in many ways, associated historically with the West, 
and the regime who claim secularity although manipulating the 
Islamic discourse, according to the circumstances, to maintain its 
structure. Secular parties were not sufficiently alert to the 
importance and influence of religious ideologies in respect to the 
people of the region. These parties adopted a subtle struggle 
against Islam, including both cultural and faith dimensions, 
despite Islam’s authoritative popular appeal. In doing so, they 
employed Westernization approaches, but these had negative 
associations and were destined to be ineffective. Their ideologies 
did not attempt to pragmatically engage with Islam, but rather 
keep those secularist ideologies pristine through blaming Islam. 
As a result, those parties missed the opportunity to bring 
cumulative change to people’s social and cultural legacies. 
Consequently, this caused those parties to turn into closed 
oligarchies, blaming grassroots and their culture for any 
complications, including later armament. Thus, instead of 
upholding popular responsibility and providing competent 
leadership with a clear project and strategies, these parties 
sustained their elitist status, losing their leadership role and 
blaming their failure on the ignorance of the people.40  
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In summary, both secularist and Islamist parties used religion 
to maintain their respective ideological narratives. Both are 
“Islam-centred”, either for or against, using it as the base for their 
rivalry, ideology, and practices. However, neither has presented a 
clear vision, strategy or project to help the people achieve their 
demands.  
 
3. The Dilemma of Mass Leadership  
After years of mass political passivity, Syria, since the beginning 
of the Uprising, has developed into a politicized society, which 
according to Sartori is: 
“...a society that both takes part in the operations of the political 
system and is required for the more effective performance of the 
system.”41  
This politicized public created the challenge of organizing, 
representing, and leading in order to utilize this mass power 
effectively and turn it into an authoritative pressure tool. Usually, 
parties take on such roles and responsibilities, being the main 
vehicles for political participation and representation of the 
people by raising awareness and educating the population, 
articulating demands, recruiting political leadership and training 
them.42  
One of the key predicaments the grassroots had faced since the 
Uprising was the absence of any kind of institutionalized structure 
to organize their activities on a large scale. Although local 
coordination committees tried to play this role at the onset of the 
Uprising, the increased span of popular participation required a 
more sophisticated form of organization and representation.43 
Even collective action institutions like syndicates, initiated during 
Hafiz al-Assad’s presidency, which should have played the role 
of facilitating the organization of the masses, proved useless, if 
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not disruptive, because they were designed to play a different role. 
Consequently, after the Uprising, people faced a void of any 
organizational contingent to realize their demands.44  
The grassroots looked for institutionalized incubators to 
organize and lead their popular activism and integrate them under 
unifying goals and a common national umbrella. They expected 
opposition leaders and formations to fulfil the institutional gap,45 
but these were not prepared to meet the challenge, falling short of 
popular expectations, subsequently asserting the anti-party 
sentiment originated by the Ba'ath party legacy. The opposition 
formations never developed sufficient grassroots organizational 
and mobilizational capacity. They ignored the fact that the power 
of the masses was not merely dependent on numbers alone, but 
also realized through forming an organized and mobilized mass 
movement aimed at applying constant pressure on the regime and 
international powers to respond to popular demands.46  
The marginalization of grassroots, who were at the core of the 
Syrian Uprising, was exemplified by the total lack of coordination 
with activists inside and outside Syria, and with other components 
of Syrian society.47 Additionally, interaction with civil society 
organizations was curbed because of the belief that providing 
humanitarian aid through NGO’s would be sufficient to engage 
with the masses. This troubled relationship left no chance for 
grassroots organizations to participate effectively, depriving 
political parties of the potential power of its members.48 Without 
such membership, parties cannot legitimately claim any 
representational role in deciding the future governmental 
structure of the country. On a more practical level, 
marginalization of party memberships weakens lines of financial 
and labour resources. On the other side, members also need 
parties in place as institutions for collective action. Only by 
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engaging membership effectively can popular demands be made 
against a powerful organized regime.49  
During the critical period of the popular Uprising, and with the 
prevailing authoritarian practices of the governing monocratic 
regime, political parties and leaders have increased responsibility 
to cultivate democratic culture and values in society. The 
awareness-raising process has to start from within parties through 
practical adaptation and fostering of these values and practices, 
such as boosting the participation of all members and tolerating 
their diverse ideas and suggestions, as well as encouraging new 
views, coupling this with clear decision-making process and 
abiding by it. Notwithstanding the importance of a clear socially 
inclusive strategy aimed at including women and marginalized 
minorities from different socio-economic backgrounds,50 which 
hitherto opposition parties had failed to achieve due to the internal 
organizational and structural problems from which they 
suffered.51  
Previous failings have included using populist speeches 
without raising grassroots awareness of essential concepts. 
Similarly, instead of being socially inclusive, parties have further 
alienated themselves from broader society by demonstrating a 
discriminatory attitude especially towards women, excluding 
them from decision-making positions and involving them only to 
satisfy the requirements and conditions of the international 
community. This method of conduct was exhibited by political 
parties across the spectrum, from left to right, which resulted in 
discouraging women from political participation, who instead 
turned to civic activism in their search for meaningful 
participation.52  
In general, the way the opposition parties dealt with the masses 
resulted from several factors. First, the historical oppression of 
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traditional opposition parties and political leaders, who were 
covertly working without any grassroots base or popular 
networks, resulted in a lack of experience in dealing with popular 
masses. This, in turn, created the tendency of many political 
personalities, who were involved in struggling with the regime 
before the Uprising, to claim leadership positions based on the 
sole merit of prior activism and struggle, regardless of any other 
necessary qualifications. Second, there was the inexperience of 
nascent parties, who were unready, structurally and 
organizationally, to engage the huge numbers of active masses. 
Instead, the only interaction these formations had was at the party 
level, which is characterized by competition and rivalry.53 
Finally, the problematic elitist nature of some formations, who 
considered themselves progressive elitists, denied any elemental 
role of the masses in politics. As a result, instead of actively 
interacting with grassroots and using the power of the organized 
masses as a tool to realize people’s demands, parties sought 
power in two ways. Firstly, by using the tactic of being part of 
bigger coalitions and unions, and sometimes even splitting into 
more than one formation to count for more balloting power in any 
coalition or international conferences.54 Secondly, parties tried to 
overcome inadequate popular representation by establishing 
relations with regional and international powers. This resulted in 
maximizing the role of those external powers in the Syrian 
conflict, additionally creating potential continuity of such 
influence in the future.55 Thus, the generation of external-
subordination dynamics rather than grassroots-representation was 
one reason for the failure to reach consensus on national 
principles in order to form a basis for any resolution of the Syrian 
conflict. More grassroots representation would have validated 
party power in any resolution or agreement. Besides, a 
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representational role in the current period would probably have 
increased parties’ chances for future engagement in the 
transitional period, or even any foreseen democratic elections. 
 
3.1. Consequences of Political Parties Position towards the 
Masses  
The incompetence and attitudes of political opposition formations 
towards public masses contributed to serious consequences for 
the popular movement. These formations – formal and informal 
– are accused of being one of the causes of fragmentation in 
public opinion towards key issues, betraying grassroots 
confidence. Moreover, the transformation of the grassroots 
Uprising into regime-opposition struggle over power led to the 
prioritization of international and regional support over popular 
representation. This resulted in underestimating the grassroots 
and wasting the potential competencies of many activists inside 
Syria and in the diaspora, who were eager to use their 
qualifications and skills to participate actively in achieving the 
democratic transition, which caused the Uprising to lose its 
momentum. Likewise, those parties could not attract new 
members, restraining themselves to founding members only, and 
so they could not represent grassroots interests, aspirations, and 
expectations, especially those of young people. Not only that, but 
many also encountered the state of mass resignation of their 
membership.56 However, the inability to mobilize and organize 
grassroots was one of the main reasons that led to one of the most 
serious consequences of the Uprising, which was the 
militarization followed by the radicalization of the Uprising.57  
The militarization of the Syrian Revolution began at the end of 
2011, with civilians starting to use light weapons to protect 
themselves against the regime. In addition, some regular army 
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officers and enlistees defected to the opposition upon refusing 
their commanders’ orders to target civilians.58 However, this 
development from peaceful demonstrations to militarization was 
the result of combined factors, including the increased brutality 
of the regime against protestors, the use of different kinds of 
armaments, denying the state of “uprising” in the first place, and 
declaring that what was happening was an international 
conspiracy, executed by a group of local terrorists, which implied 
the futility of any attempts to reach a political solution.59  
Furthermore, the opposition’s political leaders and formations 
were unable to save people from the regime’s practices, and their 
concurrent incapacity to represent grassroots in the international 
fora further weakened any potential ability to do so.60 In addition, 
there were discordant voices in the opposition, with some 
indifferent towards arms proliferation while others condemned 
protesters’ resorting to militarism. The latter’s denunciation of 
arming proved weak as they imparted no practical substitute 
action to those protesters. Armament was thus seen as a solution 
of sorts with some subsequently arguing that the problem was the 
chaos of armament rather than armament per se, in that it could 
have been used as a shield of the people’s movement.61  
At a later stage, with the regime losing control over some 
areas, and with resultant security vacuums, especially in border 
regions, radical groups started to rise, finding in those areas the 
perfect environment to control and expand. People found in those 
radical groups an alternative to opposition formations, since they 
provided what those formations could not. The fundamentalist 
organizations were more experienced in organizing and 
mobilizing youth, having a clear ideology, long experience 
gained from their involvement in other countries, generous 
funding, vast networks, strategic planning, and effective 
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leadership. Those factors qualified them to take the lead in 
absorbing and using youth energies to achieve their hidden 
agendas by exploiting the desire of those youth to defeat the 
regime at any price.62  
 
4. The Evolvement of Parties  
LaPalombara and Weiner state that, “The creation of parties has 
been a continuous process. The historical graveyards are cluttered 
with parties which dominated the political scene, but which 
subsequently failed to adapt to new circumstances and therefore 
died, were absorbed by new more active movements, or withered 
into small marginal parties.”63   
The reasons for the emergence of political parties differ from 
one region to another, and there are different theories to explain 
the evolvement of parties.  
 
4.1. Party Evolvement in Developed Countries  
Western political scientists have generated a theory of evolution 
for the political party, with the cadre party of the nineteenth 
century transforming into the mass party that prevailed in the 
industrial era, then the catch-all party in the 1960s,64 followed by 
the cartel party by 1990.65 Most recently, we are witnessing the 
gradual emergence of the digital party.66  
In the context of this paper, it is important to clarify the 
differences between cadre and mass parties, since parties in the 
region have rarely transformed into mass form, or any other party 
forms, so it is beneficial to consider the defining characteristics 
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4.1.1. Cadre parties 
A cadre party can be described as a primordial party structure that 
consists of a small group of matching social and political elites, 
exerting their influence over society with total apathy of the 
masses. With its individualistic tendencies, a cadre party is far 
from being a collective organization.67  
 
4.1.2. Mass parties 
Unlike a cadre party, a mass party can be identified as a collective 
action organization aiming at integrating a large segment of the 
population into politics by organizing them into a hierarchical 
structure, occupied by a huge bureaucracy of political 
professionals. This type dominated the industrial era reflecting 
the technological, economic, and social structure reflecting the 
concept of big factories. Mass parties bring together the public 
through gathering their demands and interests, and they depend 
on grassroots for their financial and human resources. Hence, they 
seek to widen their networks by recruiting more members, 
through whom the mass party derives its legitimacy and power.68  
It is crucial to associate the legitimacy of a party with its 
respective roles, a legitimacy that is established on the popular 
base it develops; a legitimacy by which mass parties emerge both 
to strengthen and to control the access of the new masses into the 
political system.69  
The critical transition from a cadre into a mass party70 requires 
new party functions attuned to modernizing society, leading, 
mobilizing, and organizing masses and articulating their 
demands, in addition to providing the means through which the 
government and the people can communicate and connect.71  The 
historical theory explaining the development of political parties 
from a modernization perspective looks at three “crises” as the 
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main reasons driving party evolvement; legitimacy, participation 
and integration. Legitimacy crises of regimes in power lead to the 
crisis of participation, parties evolve to be the vehicle for that 
participation, and through doing so parties play a crucial role in 
building a joint national identity while integrating different 
categories into that identity.72  
In a simple comparison between a cadre and a mass party, we 
can identify core contrasts. A cadre party has a small number of 
members, seeking no recruitment. It is not open for membership 
except by formal nomination. Overall, it does not depend on 
numerical strength, rather, it counts on the influence of its 
members, and hence, it appeals to the elites and excludes the 
masses. A cadre party is reliant on the donations of the elite for 
its financial resources. The mass party by contrast has an open 
membership and it is dependent on its membership for financial 
resources and not a small number of private donors. It is essential 
for mass parties to raise the awareness of its members and educate 
them to prepare them for future official positions at both 
leadership and administration levels.73  
 
4.2. The Evolvement of Parties in Underdeveloped Countries  
As explained above, the evolution of the party in Western 
countries has gone through a number of stages; from aristocratic 
cliques, into a small group of notables, factions, cadre parties and 
developing into mass-participation parties with the advent of 
parliament, electoral systems and plebiscitary democracy.74  
However, this parliamentary theory explanation cannot be 
applied to the underdeveloped countries, due to the differences in 
the historical conditions those societies went through. For 
underdeveloped countries in the Middle East, specifically Arabic 
countries, these went from being under Ottoman control at the 
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beginning of the twentieth century, into the colonialist era under 
the control of European countries. This legacy bequeathed no 
parliamentary existence or democratic institutions, with colonial 
mandate systems mostly focused on control and subordination, 
leaving a lack of democratic apparatus post decolonialization.75  
Nonetheless, even with different historical conditions, both in 
developed and underdeveloped countries, preliminary formations 
were similar in that they were compounds of a small number of 
like-minded men, based on close relationships, common 
ideologies or common interests. The difference is that, according 
to Duverger, parties in Western countries continued their 
development from “cadre parties” into mass party forms.76 By 
contrast, parties in underdeveloped countries persisted in the form 
of a cadre party, with rare exceptional cases. This was due to the 
conditions of the colonial system, which generally did not allow 
parliamentary or constitutional experience to exist or develop. 
One example is what happened in Syria in 1920, when the French 
bombed Damascus and forced their mandate instead of respecting 
the Syrian peoples’ desire for an independent constitution.77  
In summary, parties either retained their cadre nature or took 
the shape of liberation movements against external occupation 
and sometimes later on against internal post-colonial 
governments, who were seen as sympathetic allies of previous 
occupying powers but were deemed to be acting against the will 
or interests of the majority. Therefore, the legacies of occupation, 
foreign subsidies, and cultural hegemony are important 
background factors affecting the modernization of the region’s 
countries in which parties could supposedly play a major role. 
Hence, political parties, instead of adopting the role of building 
integration and national identity or developing new systems, are 
more focussed simply on assuming a position of power. 
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5. Syrian Opposition Parties Case  
Reflecting on and applying what is mentioned above with regard 
to Syria’s popular uprising, it would be expected that opposition 
parties would assume the structure of a mass party to facilitate the 
participation process of the people. Mass parties would have been 
the most appropriate approach to organize, mobilize, and lead the 
grassroots. However, opposition parties opted for the cadre style 
of party, excluding the masses and discarding the importance of 
integrating them within the political realm. In doing so, parties 
have kept grassroots in a passive role and have limited their 
political influence in favour of party elites.78 Moreover, there is 
another potential risk on the horizon. In discord with the 
framework of modernizing theory, in which crisis forms the 
stimulus by which parties emerge, there is by contrast a high 
expectancy that parties will fail to evolve and modernize after 
passing the crises. Thus, the type and track of development of 
those parties and the roles they may play in future could well 
remain static. 
 
5.1. Future Prospects of Syrian Parties  
Syrian parties, who appear to be preoccupied with their intra- and 
inter-party struggles, should look for new resources and practices 
to re-legitimize their role in the ten-year-long conflict. They need 
to grow into major players by attracting grassroots support, rather 
than seeking foreign power endorsements. It is necessary for the 
Syrian people demanding democratic transition not to be led by 
parties who, cynically, do not take on the burden of listening to 
their voices or engaging them in the discourse about decisions 
related to key issues of their political future. The excuses used for 
excluding masses, such as political turbulence and instability, or 
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the political ignorance of the masses proclaimed by the political 
elite are unjustified. These kinds of exclusionary policies have not 
yielded any political progress in a decade.  
Syrian parties with their inept performance and abandonment 
of their role as vehicles of mass mobilization have evacuated 
more space for civil society organizations to play a more 
significant role. Unlike parties, those organizations have proved 
more able to attract young people from different walks of life 
because of their relative ideological neutrality. Those 
organizations have deployed youth talents and competences by 
providing the opportunity for participation, which parties could 
not offer.79  
Thus far, parties’ performances have proved disappointing to 
people, and no political formation has been created to fulfil the 
Syrian peoples’ aspirations.80 With their weak internal 
organization and the crisis of public confidence reflected in low 
membership, existing parties are in dire need of reform. It is vital 
for parties to find new ways to regain the trust of the masses in 
order to claim their legitimacy.  
To begin with, for a political party to be responsive to the 
needs of society and to deal with its existing complications, it 
should have a clear perception of the nature of the relationship it 
will develop with the masses. Different tools to engage people, 
mobilize followers, and raise awareness should be developed. For 
example, it is important to have a popular platform, to interact 
with a wide variety of grassroots segments by addressing different 
aspects of their lives. In addition, it is essential to keep up with 
popular trends and the spirit of the times by utilizing available 
tools and technology. Similarly, political parties should be clear 
about the kind of relationships intended with other parties, 
organizations, and regional and international powers, to avoid 
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becoming a tool in the hands of any foreign bodies, especially in 
times of crisis.81  
This paper advocates that internet and new technological 
advances might represent a chance for such reform. Digital 
technologies can play an effective role in shaping Syrian political 
parties' activities. Opposition political parties have not used 
internet technologies to their maximum capacity. Although using 
those technologies will not instantaneously solve all the mounting 
problems of apathy and distrust, they might yet provide the type 
of organizational change that will help narrow the gap between 
elites and grassroots, and to positively effect parties' roles and 
performance. 
The following section seeks to advance models for digitizing 
parties in the Syrian context, including how technology might be 
used as a tool to regain the confidence of the grassroots and 
develop new possibilities for participation. In addition, it suggests 
opportunities to assist in challenging the status quo – engaging 
existing players and influencing their power. The key matter for 
exploration is therefore: What role can digital parties play in 
bringing about democratic transition in Syria and other Arab 
Spring countries? 
 
6. The Internet in Syria 
The internet was introduced in Syria when Bashar al-Assad was 
the head of the Syrian Computer Society before he took over the 
presidency. The introduction of the internet was done for multiple 
purposes including economic modernization, legitimization of the 
regime and the mobilization of its supporters.82 However, the 
regime was also vigilant about the political risks and security 
concerns associated with introducing the internet. Yet, despite 
significant restrictions to control the usage of the internet in 
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virtual politics,83 to prevent its use by the political opposition to 
coordinate or carry out deliberations, the opposition 
circumvented the limitations through a variety of different 
technical solutions.84  
The use of the internet by opposition activists culminated in 
the era of the Arab Spring. Social media in particular played an 
important role: first, in transmitting the Uprising contagion to 
Syria after sweeping other Arab countries, and then by igniting 
the Uprising inside Syria, which was triggered by spreading news 
about peaceful demonstrations, mobilizing activists, organizing 
protests, and exposing the brutality of the regime forces against 
peaceful protesters.85 This played a very important role since the 
regime evacuated all journalists from the country following the 
inception of the 2011 Uprising.86  
Activists utilized the internet to its full capacity, unlike 
opposition political parties, who were unable to exploit the 
internet to engage people, or even to use it as a marketing tool in 
their favour. For instance, parties’ websites have never been used 
in the Syrian context as a participatory or organizational tool. 
While some parties have websites, others settled for creating 
accounts on different social media platforms. Nevertheless, 
websites were limited to serve administrative purposes like 
displaying information about a party’s founding members, 
activities, recent news, promoting the ideas and initiatives of 
party leaders, and to announce party positions towards political 
events and developments.87 Such websites do have the potential 
to be an interactivity medium instead of limiting the message to 
one-way communication.88 However, using the internet to its 
maximum potential requires, in the first place, a willingness from 
decision-makers in the party, which has previously been absent 
for different reasons, as Hague and Uhm argue, “This reluctance 
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no doubt derives from a nexus of psychological, structural, and 
institutional reasons.”89  
In the Syrian context, the internet has never been used as a tool 
for building and maintaining relationships with grassroots, and 
new communication and information technologies have never 
been used to build inter-party or party-grassroots relationships in 
a trial to regain their trust. Parties have failed to exploit potential 
participatory elements of technology. According to statistics, the 
number of internet users increased by 422,000 (+5.5%) between 
2019 and 2020, and by January 2020 there were 8.11 million 
internet users in Syria. Around six million of these were social 
media users in February 2020.90 These numbers are from inside 
Syria only, but might be substantially more if Syrians living 
abroad are considered. However, there is very little authoritative 
research, if any, on the internet usage in refugee camps and 
amongst internally displaced people, but then again it can be 
inferred that user levels are likely to be low considering the poor 
state of telecommunications infrastructure and generally 
appalling living standards for these people.  
 
6.1. Scenario of Change: Digitizing Parties 
The reassertion of Ba'ath party rule continues after more than 
forty years, and post-Revolution opposition parties’ performances 
have done little to dispel the negative notion of party within Syria, 
although it should be noted that negativity towards parties is by 
no means an exclusively Syrian phenomenon.91 Many studies 
show that people have increasing doubts about traditional parties 
and lack faith in them being a reliable representative of their 
demands, some doubting even the necessity of the party for 
organizing collective action. This negative notion is reflected by 
declining membership and decreasing voter turnout in general 
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elections. Consequently, parties are losing essential financial 
support and sources of volunteers, both on-the-ground supporters 
and activists.92  
Moreover, recent distrust in political parties has been 
capitalised on and encouraged by the different alternatives that 
hold appeal for people, such as NGOs and social media platforms. 
Those alternatives experience the dilemma of not being parties, 
yet nevertheless needing to aggregate the numerous demands and 
interests of the people in organized programs.93  
Nonetheless, the historical evolution of parties is a continuous 
process, and the roles of the party keep changing to fit the 
conditions of society. Driven by social and political movements 
requesting the change of current dominant systems,94 the use of 
the internet by digital parties in response to the demands of 
change is a mere reflection of the technological advancement of 
the current era and a trial experiment to seek to address the 
prevailing socio-economic conditions of society.95  
 
6.2. What is a Digital Party? 
In his definition of digital party, Gerbaudo mentions that “The 
term digital party attempts to capture the common essence seen 
across a number of quite diverse political formations that have 
risen in recent years and which share the common attempt of 
using digital technology to devise new forms of political 
participation and democratic decision-making.”96  
In other words, a digital party is a new political formation that 
uses digital technologies to facilitate direct democracy instead of 
a representative one in which people choose their representatives 
to act on their behalf, and purportedly remain accountable to the 
people. However, with politicians retaining power in 
representative democracy, the aim is to devolve monopolistic 
Narratives of Transformation           36 
 
political power from the hands of politicians to ordinary people 
through mass participation via digital platforms, while replacing 
the bureaucracy of traditional parties with direct communication 
between membership and leadership.  
 
6.3. Digital Party emergence  
Digital parties emerged at the beginning of the millennium and 
were further boosted after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 
alongside the growth of social media.97 By utilizing such 
technology, digital parties promise to bring back people’s control 
over their own political lives, and to respond to popular needs and 
aspirations. It involves them in shaping the political sphere 
through large-scale interactivity and participation in setting-up 
polices, and joining decision-making processes, while 
eliminating the huge bureaucracy of traditional parties. Such 
bureaucracy is seen as being an obstacle to direct contact between 
members and leadership and an impediment to holding their 
representatives accountable for political decisions and 
outcomes.98  
Mimicking social media platform concepts, digital parties are 
trying to use the internet to bring about access to participation for 
a vast membership base. People are encouraged to participate in 
this direct democracy with zero cost membership. Using digital 
party platforms in expressing their day-to-day concerns and 
coming up with initiatives to solve them these platforms engage 
members to actively discuss problems and suggest solutions. 
Besides voting on crucial issues and policies, they also include 
party leadership positions and other details related to party 
strategy. 
There are many parties, movements and campaigns that are 
described as digital parties, yet these formations differ in their 
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degree of adaptation to digital technology and structure, while 
they all share the common embrace of the digital democracy 
agenda to reach the change for which they advocate. 
One of the earliest examples are pirate parties in North Europe, 
the first of which was established in Sweden in 2006 which 
gained two seats in the European Parliament in the European 
Parliament election. The Pirate Party International (PPI)99 was 
established in Brussels in 2009 and coordinated with several other 
pirate parties in different North European countries – such as 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Iceland – with the latter 
becoming the third largest party in Iceland in the 2017 legislative 
elections. Nevertheless, some digital parties have achieved 
electoral results and others have not. Parties which failed include, 
for instance, the parties initiated in South America using the same 
pirate party concept but with different names, such as Partido de 
la Red (Party of the Net) in Argentina, and Wikipartido (Wiki 
Party) in Mexico.  
One of the most successful manifestations of digital 
formations has been the MoVimento 5 Stelle M5S (Five Star 
Movement). After its initiation in 2009, with gradual success, it 
became the first party in the Italian parliament subsequent to the 
national election of 2018. Another example is Podemos in Spain. 
In 2014, shortly after its foundation, five members from the party 
were elected to the European Parliament after receiving eight per 
cent of the votes in the European elections. Moreover, it came 
third in the parliamentary elections of 2015-16.100  
In the Syrian case, the concept of the digital party has the 
potential to end elite domination over the political process, and to 
convert grassroots political apathy into active participation by 
engaging them, and encouraging them to take part in the political 
future of the country. Arguably, one solution would be that 
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opposition parties transform themselves from their current cadre 
party form into mass party form. However, there are various 
obstacles to achieve such transformation. One of which is the 
geographical and physical barriers. With Syrians scattered all 
over the world, this represents financial and logistical challenges 
for any physical gatherings, making it difficult to implement a 
mass party format. On the other hand, it is important, as well, to 
reach out to people inside Syria, whether in areas under 
opposition or under regime control. Therefore, it is crucial to use 
innovative techniques of utilizing digital technologies, given that 
significant functions of traditional parties, such as interacting 
with people, educating them, and raising their awareness, are 
achievable by utilising the internet. 
 
6.4. Digital Party Features  
6.4.1. Membership  
Digital parties have redefined and reshaped the political party’s 
membership concept through mimicking the sign-in membership 
of social media platforms. By doing so, digital parties are ending 
their financial dependence on membership fees, which is the 
custom of traditional parties. This new shape of membership can 
be looked at as a sort of solution for declining party membership 
over the years.101 In addition, new networks can be created, based 
on a relation with members in which communication is easy, 
efficient and cost-effective.102  
This new membership aims to involve the greatest possible 
number of people, regardless of any socio-economic 
considerations. Hence, the target is to enhance the numerical 
advantage, which by implication promises the ability to mobilize 
and organize the masses. Furthermore, the large number of 
members constitutes an immense base of active volunteers who 
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can be enlisted as sources of free political assistance. This can 
engage even less active members to spread the word about the 
party through the minimal digital activity of ‘liking’ or ‘sharing’ 
a party’s posts. Hence, digital parties evade the need for a paid 
cadre and bureaucracy by replacing the element of the ‘apparatus’ 
of traditional parties with a participatory platform, 
disintermediating the relation between members and leaders of 
the party.103  
 
6.4.2. Platforms 
According to Gerbaudo, “Platforms are digital systems that act as 
execution environments of various programs and applications.”104  
The platform is essential for a digital party; in fact, it replaces the 
physical address traditional parties used to have. It is a cost-
effective way of engaging people, cutting overhead costs like 
salaries, offices and other related expenses of the traditional party. 
It is a versatile tool used to promote the party’s values, with the 
collecting of data constantly allowing for the adjustment of party 
strategy accordingly. It facilitates interaction between members 
and leaders by providing two-way communication channels, 
while offering the ability to control the level of feedback. It also 
facilitates decision-making processes by eliminating the vertical 
multi-layered method used by traditional parties, instead relying 
on more straightforward bottom-up processes. Platforms also 
create networks of specific structures with different degrees of 
privacy for members. However, such functions can be limited by 
the design of the platform which may qualify the extent of 
influence such platforms can have on promoting the political 
participation of the members. 
Platforms are designated in diverse ways to serve the needs 
and goals of the party. Some parties would use purpose-built 
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platforms, while others would use different ready-made 
interactive platforms, including social media platforms. 
Nevertheless, even with the creation of a customized platform, 
digital parties should not neglect the importance of social media 
platforms in spreading their messages and values to the widest 
audience possible. Different formations use different platforms 
for involving the masses in politics, such as the Rousseau 
platform of the Five Star Movement or the pirate parties use of 
the LiquidFeedback application. The goal of using these 
platforms is to disintermediate both the relations between 
different members and also between the members and leaders, 
thereby dispensing with the usual bureaucracy.105  
 
6.4.3. Participation 
With the existence of new, easier to use, free-membership 
interactive platforms, participation is becoming a viable choice 
for members. Although there is a scarcity of studies – if any – 
about the correlation between internet use and political activism 
in politically unstable countries, including Syria, there are some 
studies in Western countries showing the rise of political 
participation amongst people who use the internet, even in the 
absence of political drive. 
Digital parties promise direct democracy and open 
participation, enabling people to express their opinions on key 
issues about their lives, which is an essential task of the party 
since, as noted by Sartori “parties are channels of expression”.106 
The internet provides a channel of freedom of expression and 
allows the right of ordinary people to freely exchange information 
and materials of interest. By using the internet as their main tool 
of communication, digital parties are enhancing mass 
participation by reaching out to grassroots wherever located, 
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interacting with them, and building and maintaining relationships 
with them. This, furthermore, allows various activities to take 
place, including soliciting people’s opinions and receiving their 
initiatives, crowdsourcing their ideas, deliberating topics, 
balloting on different issues, enabling mass contribution, and 
accessing decision-making processes. These activities all 
contribute towards constituting the major cores of political 
participation.107  
This kind of participation is driven by the advancement of 
internet communication technologies that provide the tools to 
facilitate these new methods, with social media platforms in 
particular providing a comparatively easy and inexpensive means 
of communication to reach the masses easily. However, the 
dependence on the internet for digital parties will also require 
them to be agile; to remain relevant they need to rapidly adapt 
policies to changing environments, especially paying attention to 
the aspirations of younger generations who are the majority users. 
Furthermore, the internet is a tool for communication between 
the public and their political representatives to achieve 
democratic aims. This two-way open flow of information shapes 
the quality of representativeness of such parties. Therefore, 
reclaiming representation of the grassroots will be an important 
gain attained by digital parties. Similarly, the transparency of 
policies and decision-making strategies resulting from digital 
approaches is a step towards the accountability and good 
governance of those parties.  
Finally, the easy, open, unconditional membership eliminates 
any discrimination based on gender, religion, ethnicity, or socio-
economic conditions. This results in the opportunity for more 
inclusiveness and equal participation, especially for women who 
have traditionally been politically underrepresented due to 
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challenges such as domestic responsibilities preventing 
participation in physical meetings. 
 
6.5. Additional Benefits of Digital Parties in the Syrian 
Context  
The opportunities of wide outreach of digital parties provided by 
the internet have the potential to facilitate the organizing and 
mobilizing of grassroots, making it easier for leadership to call 
people to action and to organize online and offline activities, 
making the digital party active in the public sphere. This would 
overcome the declining collective action through traditional 
representatives. Furthermore, there is the ability to organize 
online training sessions to spread knowledge and awareness about 
important issues to the party membership.108  
There is also the ability to extend political reach via organized 
channels offered by the methods of digital parties. In Syria, the 
opposition may have the chance to promote the Uprising ideals 
throughout the country and around the world through the creative 
means of discussion groups and emails, to create networks of 
resistance to authoritarian state power and in support of 
democratic transition by using the internet as a communication 
tool to spread their message to build domestic and international 
support for reform. 
Due to the relatively low-cost of the internet, resorting to 
digital form will enable parties with limited resources to increase 
their media representation and secure their existence.109 Parties 
that previously received little or no coverage in the traditional 
media will have a platform from which to reach a much larger 
audience, replacing reliance on traditional media to spread their 
messages. This will be important given the modest existence of 
the opposition in traditional (non-social) media channels, and the 
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scarcity of opposition satellite channels, with some failing to 
continue after their inception,110 and others prioritizing the private 
agendas and interests of their owners over any national agenda.  
 
6..6. Challenges of Digital Parties  
The challenges of digital parties include internet-related concerns 
such as cyber-security, lack of privacy, protection of sensitive 
data from third parties, absence of standards and regulations.111 
Yet, there are other challenges related to the ability of digital 
parties to commit to their pronounced objectives. One potential 
risk is that instead of instigating direct democracy, it instead shifts 
into plebiscitary democracy. The latter would be one in which the 
role of citizenry is limited to accepting or refusing referendums 
or initiatives proposed by party leaderships, without being part of 
the process of suggesting, deliberating and forming the policies 
of the party.112 To avoid this, digital parties should involve people 
by interacting with members and providing the options for 
crowdsourcing, while being open to various ideas rather than 
trying to use people’s votes to implement the vision of the party’s 
leadership. Similarly, they need to use technology to advance 
participatory qualities that they currently lack and avoid using it 
simply to empower the party’s existing practices. 
Another challenge is that digital parties tend to attract a 
specific group of constituents who are not representative of the 
population as a whole. Those participants are commonly highly 
educated, with proficiency in using the internet, typically 
meaning the active, skilled younger population. This, in turn, 
would result in excluding people with few digital skills, and with 
no or little access to internet. To overcome this, digital parties 
have to come up with new mechanisms for engaging citizens and 
using offline approaches and innovative solutions. For example, 
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by using complementary non-digital resources this could attract a 
wider audience while avoiding the risk of nominal membership, 
turning members into mere spectators with diminished activism 
or commitment, which is usually associated with adopting social 
media membership styles.  
However, the involvement of the masses in decision-making 
and the consequent necessity of adapting to the results of their 
demands and wishes would raise the risk of transforming parties’ 
original principles and values, which could undermine a party’s 
credentials in terms of what it stands for in the first place. 
Moreover, the open membership with an open platform of 
discussion and decision-making might expose the party to capture 
by opponents. In the Syrian case, because of the current conflict, 
the risk will be higher for anti-regime parties with the existence 
of the Assad regime’s utilization of an electronic army.113 
Moreover, the high tension and sensitivity at this stage of the 
conflict will present the risk of increasing polarization of opinion 
among the opposition itself from one side, and all Syrians in 
general, since people tend to be attracted to others who share their 
opinions and values.  
Finally, applying digital technologies is not the goal per se. 
Using them will not overcome the popular distrust of existing 
parties. Rather, they are tools that should be used to organize and 
combine online and offline activism to engage grassroots and 
overcome their exclusion from the political sphere. In addition, 




Syrian parties suffer from many internal and external problems, 
with mass-exclusionary practices being one of the main roots of 
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the difficulties. By marginalizing grassroots elements, the 
political action of opposition parties appears to have lost direction 
during the Syrian conflict. Instead of being vehicles for collective 
action, mass participation, and public representation, they 
retreated to cadre- or elite-type formations, who only care about 
their own interests and share of the political scene. Additionally, 
instead of assuming their role in modernizing Syrian society, 
raising awareness, educating citizens and building a common 
national identity, they conceded those roles, instead following 
narrow ethnic or ideological interests, and sometimes foreign 
agendas. Consequently, opposition parties lost the trust and 
representation of the grassroots, and at the same time wasted the 
potential capacities and qualifications of those masses.  
To re-engage the public in the political process, the format of 
digital party could well precisely represent the inclusive tool and 
innovative solution that is needed. With its open, easily 
accessible, participatory platform allowing for transparent 
bottom-up policies and decision-making processes, this might 
change popular apathy and distrust, and motivate the masses to 
participate again, while also holding those parties accountable. 
While digital parties alone will not be able to tackle pervasive 
complications of opposition formation, they should be deployed 
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